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Franciszek Longchamps de Bérier
Roman law is the history of the law, in which questions are constantly 
raised about our understanding of its values and the principles that guide 
it, as well as primarily the correctness and regularity of conduct in human 
communities. The study of Roman regulations, and their impact on European 
legal traditions, provides the grounds, as well as extensive material for 
independent thought about the subject of private law. It helps to deal with 
contemporary problems, creating a historical and dogmatic perspective, 
but without being bound by the wording of a currently applicable legal 
regulation. The wording is not the starting point, although it does frequently 
inspire academic research. And such wording is not of primary importance.
The question of the reception of law or of lack of its reception is a good 
opportunity to return to the issue of the abuse of rights.1 The perception of such 
abuse in Roman law seems to cast an interesting light on the issue of reception 
as well as natural law and the nature of law. Nowadays reference is usually 
made to the abuse of substantive rights, although the concept of substantive 
rights in itself gives rise to a number of problems. I have tackled the issue 
about the experience of Roman law as follows: what does Roman private law 
say about the experiences that the nineteenth and twentieth century doctrine 
refers to as abuse of rights or – if someone prefers – substantive rights. For 
obvious reasons, the use of the term substantive rights does not actually 
help when studying the past. You could then say that there is a danger of 
anachronism. Anachronisms should be avoided wherever possible. However, 
in its contemporary structure, the abuse of substantive rights has developed as 
a tool for dealing with the conflicts of interests of various legal entities that 
arise in practice.2 This proved to be necessary because the Polish legislator, i.e. 
the Polish Civil Code, abstractively specifies the area in which it is possible 
1  F. longchamPs de Bérier, Nadużycie prawa w świetle rzymskiego prawa prywatnego, 2 ed. 
amended and supplemented. Wrocław (2007), and now an edition in Italian: F. longchamPs 
de Bérier, L’abuso del diritto nell’esperianza del diritto privato romano. Giapicchelli 
(2012).
2  m. Pyziak-szaFnicka, Prawo podmiotowe, in: System Prawa Prywatnego, vol. 1, ed. 
m. Safjan, Warszawa (2007), p. 771.
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to operate within the law – which is treated as a system – and therefore gives 
powers that serve to make laws real. Within the theory of the law, the notion 
of the abuse of rights is one of the trends for opening up legal institutions to 
criteria outside the legal system.3 And it is precisely these criteria, which are 
currently called criteria outside the system, to which reference is made when 
the question arises of the Roman legal experience. It is obviously possible to 
ask about this experience in various contexts.4 
In its implementation, the Napoleonic Code – mainly in order to make 
rights as well as the certainty of the law absolute – did not provide for the 
ability to refer to abuse. This concept needed, therefore, to be developed in 
the judicature in France – obviously, the statement “needed to be” arises when 
looking at it from the perspective of the experience of Roman law. French 
case law from the 1870s, initiated by the ruling of the court of appeal in 
Colmar in 1855, provided a particular incentive for a discussion on the abuse 
of rights.5 In contemporary French doctrine, it is constantly emphasized that 
each case of an abuse of substantive rights needs to be reviewed separately. 
And since, nowadays, it is impossible to present a single concept of the abuse 
of substantive rights, which is common to all civil law relationships, the courts 
do not feel bound by any of the criteria indicated by the doctrine. In case law, 
they simply apply the principle of fairness – l’équité.6
Abuse of rights is usually related to their implementation, which is 
treated as taking steps which lie within the sphere of the ability to behave 
in the manner specified by that law.7 And at least two views of the concept 
of abuse of rights are proposed: namely the broad view and narrow view. 
According to the former, the judge would receive a standard authorizing 
him to make corrections to the binding provisions of the law in each case in 
which he considered the application of such provisions to be unfair or unjust. 
Ius aequum would operate here at the expense of ius strictum. However, in the 
narrow approach, only the behaviour is to be assessed and not the regulations 
or – more precisely – the consequences of their application. This only happens 
in the case of exercising rights; namely making use of one’s rights. Therefore, 
3  l. leszczyński, Nadużycie prawa – teoretycznoprawny kontekst aksjologii luzu 
decyzyjnego, in: Nadużycie prawa. Konferencja Wydziału Prawa i Administracji 1 marca 
2002, ed. H. Izdebski and A. Stępkowski. Warszawa (2003), p. 27.
4  Cf. e.g. F. longchamPs de Bérier, Rechtsmissbrauch in der Rechtsprechung polnischer 
Gerichte zum BGB, in: Deutsches Sachenrecht in polnischer Gerichtspraxis, ed. W. Dajczak 
and H.-G. Knothe. Berlin (2005), pp. 265-9.
5  The Judgement of 02.06.1855, D.P. 1856. 2. 9.
6  m. Pyziak-szaFnicka, op. cit., p. 775.
7  a. Wolter/J. ignatoWicz/k. steFaniuk, Prawo cywilne. Warszawa (2001), p. 147.
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a correction is made in the event of the unlawful use of a right.8 In this context, 
it is clearly visible that the dispute between the external and internal theory 
of abuse of rights, which is so highly emphasized in Poland, is essentially 
academic. This is because the difference boils down to specifying the source of 
the illegality, hence this dispute does not appear so clearly in other countries. 
A lawyer, who uses the so-called internal theory to reconstruct the applicable 
legal standard, takes into account all the relevant provisions of the given act 
of law. He, therefore, also takes into account the prohibition to take advantage 
of the law, as expressed in Article 5 of the Polish Civil Code, which would be 
in conflict with the socio-economic purpose of the law and the rules of social 
coexistence. Proponents of the so-called external theory, first reconstruct what 
is “named” as a given person’s right based on the provisions of the Code, with 
the exception of Article 5 of the Polish Civil Code. Only then, by treating the 
provision containing the prohibition to act in conflict with the rules of social 
coexistence and the socio-economic purpose of the law – as the fundamental 
provision – do they treat it as the standard, which is addressed to persons 
“having a right.”9 However, the practical consequence of both methods of 
reasoning is the same: behaviour in conflict with the criteria set out in Article 
5 of the Polish Civil Code is considered illegal. 
Two allegations with regard to the internal theory appear to be particularly 
important. The first applies to making substantive rights contingent on the facts 
and variable assessments from the point of view of social coexistence and the 
socio-economic purpose of the law. The second is the doubt regarding actually 
equating action, which is outside the law, or which is illegal, with abuse of 
rights. This is because the difference between normal illegal behaviour and 
behaviour, the illegality of which arises from the abuse of rights, is clear and 
cannot be removed by recourse to the internal theory. The illegality of the 
conduct of an entity which is abusing substantive rights is transient and is 
unquestionably relative, and not permanent – at least until the acquisition 
of the rights – and absolute, i.e. independent of whether or not it strikes at 
anyone’s rights or breaches anyone’s interests.10 
It is always possible to refer to the tradition of Roman law. The comment 
formulated by Gaius in the 2nd century AD, male enim nostro iure uti non 
debemus – “we should not wrongly benefit from our rights” 11 is today proudly 
displayed at the entrance to the building of the Supreme Court in Warsaw. 
8  m. Pyziak-szaFnicka, op. cit., pp. 782f.
9  s. WronkoWska, Analiza pojęcia prawa podmiotowego. Poznań (1973), p. 88. 
10  m. Pyziak-szaFnicka, op. cit., pp. 789-90.
11  Gai. Inst. 1,53.
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The next comment, attributed to the 3rd-century jurist, Paulus: non omne quod 
licet honestum est – “not everything that is permitted, is honest”12 – can be seen 
on another pillar of the Palace of Justice. Contemporary scholars also recall 
that the system of private law does not allow the exercise of substantive rights 
in breach of moral standards and the purpose of the law.13 The prohibition of 
abuse is addressed to entitlees, from whom the legislator does not remove 
such entitlement, even though they breach the rules of social coexistence or 
the socio-economic purpose of the law. The law giver qualifies the entitlees 
behaviour as illegal, even though they have exercized one of the rights to 
which they were entitled within the framework of the abstractively phrased 
content of a given substantive right. 
Making reference to the abuse of the rights and therefore noticing the need 
to adjust how advantage is taken of one’s rights in specific cases gives rise to 
theological analogy. Reflecting on the Revelation in an orderly manner leads 
to the formulation of various arguments or conclusions, the construction of 
dogmatic theories or even theological systems. However, their correctness is 
verified by their application and the practical consequences: the orthodox or 
unorthodox result. A community of believers keeps invariable truths of its 
faith as a deposit, which is proclaimed to successive generations in different 
ways. Theologians propose scholastic or modern structures to which they are 
more or less convinced. However, they all pass the simple Biblical test “by 
their fruit you will recognize them.”14 If it does not produce “good fruit”, 
this means it does not work. Obviously, the community assesses whether or 
not the fruit is good, but this is frequently plain to everyone. Likewise with 
the feeling of justice, that appears and constitutes the final justification for 
a correction of an abuse of rights. This also happens with the law and its 
structures with respect to social reality and with respect to people in general. 
Meanwhile, it is well known that certain philosophical and legal concepts 
are late, so to say, with respect to the development of the law, while others 
arise even before their time, without bringing any real effects.15 The abuse of 
rights was noticed before such structure arose in private law, and before talk 
of substantive rights began. After all, an acquired right does not need to be, 
sensu stricto, substantive, that is at least indicated by the research on abuse in 
the area of criminal proceedings.
12  D. 50,17,144 pr. Paul.
13  m. Pyziak-szaFnicka, op. cit., p. 791.
14  Mt 7,16.20.
15  t. giaro, ‘Abusus iuris’ a nadużycie prawa, Uniwersytet Kardynała Stefana Wyszyńskiego. 
Zeszyty Prawnicze 7.1 (2007), p. 286.
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In the age of Codes and legal positivism, reference to experience has been 
made far more difficult by concentrating on the solutions adopted by the 
legislator. It therefore proved necessary to create the structure of the abuse 
of rights. Just like this structure, the institution of unjustified enrichment and 
offset (compensatio) were not known under Roman law. Fortunately, nobody 
claims that Roman law was unaware of cases of the social problems to which 
they apply and did not try to remedy them effectively. Therefore the question 
regarding universality remains current: also in the light of the difficulties with 
defining what a substantive right is and what is an abuse of rights; specifying 
the relationship between a substantive right and an entitlement and the question 
of experience in terms of “exercising one’s rights.” Essentially, it boils down 
to the question of the criteria for assessing use: not abstract and theoretical, 
but in specific cases. Hence, for example, the proposal to read Roman sources, 
which, by assumptions, do not have ideological assumptions,16 not in order to 
seek a reflection of one’s own ideas in them, but to understand the historical 
symptoms of the reaction. French literature willingly looks for examples of 
an effective reaction to the abuse of rights centuries before Colmar case law. 
It is also possible to deduce such a judgement from the previously emerging 
case law.17 However, it is not possible to escape from the question – although 
lawyers are rather reluctant to ask it, perhaps thinking they are not competent 
– about the sources of such social or legal reactions. 
The basis of the proposed question regarding ancient experience includes 
starting from the typologically specified problem of the abuse of rights, in order 
to then examine how the Quirites solved this problem.18 Despite the lack of 
structure or even theory concerning the abuse of rights in ancient Rome, this 
applies to a real phenomenon, which can be specified typologically. Today, when 
dogmatics of civil law developed a structure and theory of abuse of rights, the 
considerations most frequently boil down to the specific types of cases reviewed 
by the courts. And it is they that decide with considerable freedom when, in 
practice, to consider that substantive rights have been abused. 
It can be seen in both the activities of the courts and in the ancient reactions 
to certain methods of exercising personal rights that, in the first instance, 
16  F. longchamPs de Bérier, ‘Summum ius summa iniuria’. Sulle premesse ideologiche 
nell’interpretazione delle fonti antiche, in: ‘Fides, humanitas, ius’. Studii in onore di Luigi 
Labruna, vol. 5, Napoli (2007), pp. 2919-32.
17  H. et L. mazeaud/J. mazeaud/F. chaBas, Leçons de droit civil. Obligations. Théorie 
générale, 9 ed. Paris (1998), vol. 2.1, pp. 477f.; a. gamBaro, Abuse of rights in civil 
law tradition, European Review of Private Law 4 (1995), p. 565; see also u. mattei, 
Comparative Law and Economics. Michigan (1997), p. 36.
18  t. giaro, op. cit., p. 274.
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the abuse of rights appears as a problem in the role of ethics in law. From 
a structural point of view, this is related primarily to exercising governing 
rights, although it can arise in various eras and various dogmatic contexts. 
In all certainty, the matter does not boil down to terminological issues as, for 
instance, the history of using the statement abus de droit, Rechtsmissbrauch, 
the abuse of substantive rights. We tried to pay attention to this in our 
textbook on Roman law. We decided to present Roman law by extending the 
“angle of vision by the so-called second life of Roman law in contemporary 
Europe, which also affects the presentation of its ancient history. Some 
legal historians reject such view as being an anachronistic measure of the 
past using a contemporary yardstick. In accordance with the purist directive 
to only use source terms, they fall into nominalism, which assumes that the 
criterion for the existence of a given institution is the use of its own name. 
Hence, the ideal rule of law would appear together with the name Rechtsstaat, 
and repression of the abuse of rights would appear together with the term 
abus de droit – in both cases as late as in the 19th century. Meanwhile, at the 
start of the development of the law, which, as a rule, took place through an 
unconscious practice, the name of the legal institution is frequently younger 
than the institution itself. It is sufficient to mention the phenomenon of 
silent law, preceding the articulated language, or many alleged discoveries 
of the modern theory of the law, involving the naming of phenomena which 
have been known for a long time. It is also erroneously assumed that the 
significance of Roman law to modern times arises from the continuity of its 
development to the present days, allegedly guaranteed by the formal reception 
of Roman law in contemporary Europe. However, wherever institutional 
continuity is interrupted, no references, renaissances and models or indirect 
inspirations are recognized.”19 The most recent international encyclopaedia 
of legal history is not afraid of including considerations from only Chinese 
law under the term of rule of law. Initially, the restriction made in the legal 
area in which not only traditionally, but also generally, nobody really expects 
the term of rule of law to be used, is surprising. It is all because of despotic 
emperors and their 20th-century successors. However, the authoress of the 
term initially gives the definition that the rule of law should be understood as 
a constellation of values and methods of proceeding based on the assumption 
that a healthy legal order subordinates the interests of the ruling elite to the 
law. She cites Aristotle, because she is aware that the rule of law is identified 
with the classical Greek definition and liberal institutions of countries from 
19  W. daJczak/t. giaro/F. longchamPs de Bérier, Prawo rzymskie. U podstaw prawa 
prywatnego. Warszawa (2009), p. 36.
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the West. Even so, there are no doubts that elements of the rule of law may 
also be noticed in traditional Chinese political culture. She starts her overview 
in the 4th century BC, tracing it up to the times of the last dynasty and the era 
of turbulent socio-political changes in China in the last century.20 
The procedural approach is highly typical of Roman law, so lawyers who 
are more aware immediately respond to the question of the abuse of rights 
in Roman law as: exceptio doli, which is rightly also called the allegation of 
an abuse of rights. However, this is not the only sign of Romans noticing an 
abuse of rights. It constitutes a response to someone filing a complaint, as 
a result of which – in a specific case – the praetor allowed for a correction. 
Unfortunately, there is insufficient room here to present other incidences of 
ancient responses to the abuse of rights, although this has been referred to 
more extensively elsewhere. However, we need to be guided towards the 
conclusions stemming from them. 
As in ancient times, the abuse of rights is a noticeable social problem 
even in contemporary times, as a result of which a response from the legal 
order is expected. Roman experience tends to show the external theory route. 
Inevitably, internal theory is only possible in the legal system. However, in the 
age of decodification, it is not – at least in the enlightenment sense – every legal 
order which increases the significance of making reference to the experience 
of Roman law. And it is precisely in the context of the question about the 
abuse of rights that Roman law enables the trend to be noticed in man, which 
is more original than conviction and not necessarily rooted permanently 
in the individual or collective consciousness, while simultaneously being 
independent of any reception, acquisition or model of conduct. This trend 
usually appears in extreme cases. It manifests itself in specific reactions to 
wrongly exercising the rights granted by the law – wrongly more in the social 
than in the individual meaning. It most clearly manifests a sense of justice, 
which is part of human nature. A sign of natural law is visible here, because 
this trend in the method of perceiving reality proves to be a regularity which 
is, by nature, original with respect to human convictions – rather than just their 
derivative. Compared with ancient sources, this observation appears to be so 
important to the question of humanistic universality that the Roman example 
in this regard is very different from contemporary examples. In the case of 
the ancient examples mentioned, there is still no mention of the influence of 
Christianity. Questions of natural law should not necessarily be combined 
20  k. gottschang turner, s.v. rule of law, The Oxford International Encyclopedia of Legal 
History, ed. S. Katz, vol. 5, Oxford University Press (2009), pp.164-6. Rec. F. longchamPs 
de Bérier, Forum prawnicze 2 (2010), pp. 88-95.
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with religious issues, but they should without doubt be combined with moral 
issues. And this does not contain any ideology. The Roman example is always 
interesting because the legal solutions used by the Quirites still appear as 
central pragmatic considerations. And so, Roman private law shows that the 
ethical element can play an important role and makes itself known in the 
practice of applying the law. The source of this is a trend which is noticeable 
in man. It constitutes not only one of many expressions of public awareness, 
but an important and interesting expression of public awareness arising from 
common sense, which shapes social relations and reaches as deep as the 
natural and original sense of justice. To conclude, even if there is no reception 
of law, it does not mean there are no historic arguments – particularly deriving 
from Roman law – that are interesting and instructive.
